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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
distinguished the earlier case in that it was the administrative act which took the
nurse away from her station of vigil which was the proximate cause of the injury.
The same rationale was employed in the Santose case, 14 where a nurse was required
as part of her duties to answer the telephone. During her brief absence from the
"labor room" a patient was overcome by a rare psychosis (which sometimes
accompanies labor during child birth), and committed suicide by jumping out
of a window. The question of the hospital's negligence is not maintaining adequate
supervision or barring the windows was submitted to the jury.
In that case the plaintiff's intestate was an adult woman apparently "of sound
mind and body," and the hazard of this sort of mental derangement under these
conditions was rather remote; yet the question of the hospital's negligence was
submitted to the jury. In the instant case a helpless day old infant was placed
in a position of "obvious danger" from which it could not extricate itself; i.e., the
hazard of injury was patently foreseeable. The question of negligence here was a
fortiori for the jury.

Special Employee
In Stone v. Bigley Bros.,'5 defendant contracted with the Bethlehem Steel
Company to transport steel from a dock to a bridge construction site. All unloading
at this site was to done by Bethlehem. The day plaintiff was injured, defendant
carried steel to the bridge site on its own truck, which was driven by its own
employee. The steel was fastened on the truck with chains which were part of
the truck's equipment. At the bridge site, a Bethlehem employee took over
direction of the unloading. The usual practice at this point was for Bethlehem
employees to fasten Bethlehem's chains around the steel, and have Bethlehem's
crane hook and place strain on them; only then would defendant's truck driver
unfasten its chains. On this occasion, however, defendant's truck driver unfastened one of its chains without waiting for the Bethlehem crane to put a strain
on the steel, with the result that some steel fell off the truck and injured plaintiff,
a Bethlehem employee. The issue on appeal was whether defendant's truck driver
was, as a matter of law, a special employee of Bethlehem at the time of his negligent
conduct since Bethlehem was in charge of the unloading. The Court of Appeals
refused to find the driver a special employee of Bethlehem as a matter of law,
holding that it would not be unreasonable for a jury to "conclude that even though
this loosening of the truck's chains was part of the unloading preparations, nevertheless, in another sense it was part of the truck driver's duty." The dissent argued
that the driver was a special employee of Bethlehem, that under the contract
14. Santose v. Unity Hospital, 301 N. Y. 153, 93 N. E. 2d 574 (1950).
15. 309 N. Y. 132, 127 N. E. 2d 913 (1955).
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when the driver brought the truck to its destination the carrier's function ended,
and "the circumstance that the chains were loosened by the driver of the truck is
irrelevant."
An employer is liable for the torts of his employees committed in the course
of their employment by him.' 6 A general employee of one employer, however,
may become a special employee of another, and thereby render the former employer
free from any tort liability.17 A general employee does not become a special
employee unless his first employer surrenders, and his later one assumes, the
power to command the employee as to the details as well as to the ultimate result
of his work.' 8 In the absence of proof that the general employer has surrendered
19
control completely, it must be presumed that his control continued. Generally,
whether control has been surrendered will be determined according to the peculiar
facts and circumstances of each case. 20
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Civil Service, Veterans Preference
After World War II, the New York State Constitution provided that a
disabled veteran, as to civil service lists, should be entitled to preference and
should be appointed or promoted before any other appointments or promotions
were made, without regard to his or her standing on any list from which such
appointment or promotion was to be made.1 In furtherance of this constitutional
policy, the statutes of New York provided that any person whose name was on
any eligible list should retain his rights and status while in military service; that
if such person's name was reached while he was in military service he would be
placed on a special eligible list which would have a preference to all subsequent
lists; that for purposes of seniority, training and experience credit such person
should "be deemed to have been appointed on the earliest date upon which any
2
eligible, who was the lower on such original eligible list was appointed.- In
3
McQuillan v. Schechter the court, to protect the rights of veterans, extended its
anara v.Leipzig, 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E. 244 (1919); Irwin v. Klein,
16. Mca
271 N. Y. 477, 3 N. E.2d 601 (1936).
17. Braxton v. Mendelson, 233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 198 (1922).
18. Wawrzonek v. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 276 N. Y. 412, 12
N. E. 2d 525 (1938); Irwin v. Klein, supra, note 16.
19. Delisa v. Arthur F. Schmidt Inc., 285 N. Y. 314, 34 N E. 2d 336 (1941);
Wawrzonek v. CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp., supra,note 19; Irwin v. Klein,
supra, note 16; Bartolomeo v. Charles Bennett Contracting Co., 245 N. Y. 66, 156
N. E. 98 (1927).
20. Irwin v. Klein, supra, note 16; Braxton v. Mendelson, supra,note 17.
1. N. Y. CONsT. art. V, §6.
2. N. Y. MILrrARY LAW §243(7).

3. 309 N. Y. 15, 127 N. E. 2d 731 (1955).

